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IN THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE:
FLORIDA COURTS, JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, AND POLITICS
Drew Noble Lanier* and Roger Handberg**
I. INTRODUCTION
Underlying many of the shrill arguments made in the aftermath
of the 2000 presidential vote in Florida were questions regarding
judicial independence. The concept of judicial independence is
often expressed in absolutist terms, but the reality is more com-
plex. Courts, regardless of their rhetoric, are political institutions,
born of politics and subject to political whims.
Florida state courts are no exception. This Article connects the
historic events of the 2000 presidential election to the larger ques-
tion of how to balance what are often seen as incompatible vari-
ables: judicial independence and political accountability.'
The political and legal wrangling surrounding the 2000 presiden-
tial elections crystallized long-brewing public animosity towards
the judiciary, particularly the Florida Supreme Court, perceived to
be out-of-step politically with the rest of the state government. In
this Article, we will discuss the concept of judicial independence,
the political nature of courts, and efforts to insulate courts from the
ordinary politics engulfing the popularly elected branches. We first
review Florida's political history and changing political landscape.
We then trace the development of the state's judicial selection
processes and tie those processes to current legislation that the
Florida legislature has considered and, in some cases, enacted in
the wake of the 2000 Presidential election. Finally, we consider the
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likely consequences of efforts to diminish the insulation that the
Florida courts enjoy from the politics of the day.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
A. Politics Defined and Judicial Politics Explored
The key to understanding questions of judicial independence is
to appreciate the political nature of courts. When we use the word
"politics," we do not employ its pejorative variant. Rather, the
definition we attach to politics is derived from the understanding
that courts influence the policy-making process. In particular, we
adopt the conventional definition of politics in our field: the pro-
cess by which authoritative decisions are made about the allocation
of goods in society.2 Under this definition, judges have discretion,
grounded in their respective jurisdiction, as to what judgments to
render and whose interests to protect. They can support certain
policies and outcomes while opposing others. Courts throughout
the United States do so on a daily basis without arousing much
public interest or controversy.3
While courts are certainly political institutions, they are also le-
gal institutions that differ from the other political branches. Courts
operate within a field of bounded discretion due to pre-existing
rules that govern their decision-making. These include procedural
and evidentiary rules that limit how and when courts can act and
constrain a court's options when issuing a decision. Those rules
inure to the legal system's benefit in that litigants and the public
can generally anticipate how a court will react. This consistency
gives the judiciary a greater legitimacy than that of the relatively
unpredictable executive and legislative branches. Periodically,
courts and their decisions captivate the public's attention. When
their decisions are viewed to contradict the interests of the public,
their behavior is often discussed at length.4 In those highlighted
situations, the policy-making power of the judiciary becomes ap-
parent to even casual observers who may vigorously oppose the
policy interests annunciated in the court's decision. This dynamic
2. DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 40-50 (1965).
3. Each state has a separate and autonomous judicial system in addition to that
of the federal government. DAVID W. NEUBAUER, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW,
COURTS, AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 54 (2d ed. 1997).
4. Roger Handberg & Mark Lawhorn, The Courts: Powerful but Obscure, in
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN FLORIDA 148-68 (Robert J. Huckshorn ed., 2d ed.
1998). In addition to the 2000 presidential election contest, celebrity cases, such as
O.J. Simpson's criminal trial in 1994-1995 in California, temporarily bring courts into
the public eye. See NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 244-45.
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certainly was apparent during and following the presidential elec-
tion in 2000. After that election, serious questions of judicial inde-
pendence still linger.
B. Judicial Independence Defined
Judicial independence in America often resembles the proverbial
elephant being examined by four blind men. Each reports a
description of the beast based on touching the elephant in only one
area. Judicial independence experienced a similar fate during the
2000 presidential election. The struggle over which candidate, Re-
publican George W. Bush or Democrat Al Gore, received the most
popular votes in Florida, and thus who would become president of
the United States, heightened awareness of judicial independence.
When partisans begin to attack the legitimacy of the courts' deci-
sion-making power, questions of judicial independence become rel-
evant. Many laud the independence of the judiciary without really
knowing what judicial independence entails. To understand the
political nature of courts as a policy-making arm of the govern-
ment, the term "judicial independence" must be clearly under-
stood. Becker defines judicial independence as follows:
Judicial independence is (a) the degree to which judges believe
they can decide and do decide consistent with their own political
attitudes, values and conceptions of judicial role (in their inter-
pretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others, who have
or are believed to have political or judicial power, think about
or desire in like matters, and (c) particularly when a decision
adverse to the beliefs or desires of those with political or judicial
power may bring some retribution on the judges personally or
on the power of the court.6
For our purposes, the last element is key: judges must not be
unduly limited in their decision-making by external influences. Ac-
cordingly, "judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of the government" 7 are judicially independent. This in-
dependence becomes the touchstone of the courts, because without
it, no one would agree to the judicial resolution of their dispute.
5. Tony Mauro, Judges Taking Heat for Overturning Initiatives, USA TODAY,
May 12, 1997, at 5A.
6. THEODORE L. BECKER, COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
FUNCTIONING OF THE COURTS 144 (1970).
7. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980).
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The judge's initial neutrality is necessary even though ultimately
the court favors one party over the other.
Becker specifically defines the structural elements that must be
present for courts to be independent.9 Their salary cannot be re-
duced while in office. They must have a fixed tenure (for a specific
term of years or life) rather than having their employment be sub-
ject to the caprice of some other political actor (notably the execu-
tive). Finally, they must be selected either through executive
appointment that is checked by some other actor or through direct
election.10 The federal courts, for example, meet each of these
criteria."
Florida state courts, however, satisfy only two of the three ele-
ments. The judges of the state's highest court and the intermediate
courts of appeals are selected under the merit system, or the so-
called Missouri Plan.12 Because extra-governmental actors are in-
cluded in the selection process (at least ostensibly), there is some
measure of independence provided to the judges of these courts. 13
In fact, in 1976 Florida voters opted to change the judicial selection
method for the district courts of appeal and the supreme court
from non-partisan election to the merit system in an attempt to
bolster the political independence of the judiciary.1 4 Circuit and
8. MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE AND POLITI-
CAL ANALYSIS 1-64 (1981).
9. BECKER, supra note 6, at 148.
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, art. III, § 1.
12. Under this system, a judicial nominating commission composes a list of poten-
tial nominees, which is then given to the governor, who selects from among the listed
individuals. After serving for one year, the incumbent stands in a retention election
and, if successful, serves a term of six years. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10-11; see also
FLA. STAT. ch. 43.291 (2001) (detailing the composition and selection process for
members of the Judicial Nominating Commission). For a more in-depth discussion of
the Florida judicial system, see CAROL M. BAST, FLORIDA COURTS 37, 44 (2d ed.
1998) and B.K. Roberts, The Judicial System, in THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1997-1998
199 (Allen Morris & Joan Perry Morris eds., 26th ed. 1998).
13. However, during the last general session, the Florida legislature amended the
governing statute to increase the power that the governor has over the selection of
judges on these appellate courts. Prior to the amendment creating the current form of
the statute (43.291), the Florida Bar was given the authority to nominate individuals
without the intervention of the governor. Florida Bar members were selected to
serve on various commissions created for each of the appellate courts throughout the
state. See FLA. STAT. ch. 43.29 (2000). We will more fully discuss the language of this
bill and its attendant implications for the Florida courts below. See infra notes 114-131
and accompanying text.
14. See Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 158; Rick Karl, Electing Supreme
Court Justices-For the Last Time, 60 JUDICATURE 290 (1977) (discussing the 1976
elections to fill spots on the Florida Supreme Court); cf. Melinda Gann Hall, State
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county court judges, on the other hand, are selected in non-parti-
san elections and serve four-year terms.' 5 Thus, for all four levels
of courts in the judicial hierarchy, Becker's second and third indicia
of judicial independence-fixed tenure and selection by either
election or checked executive appointment-are satisfied.
While the state's constitution and statutes provide some measure
of tenure protection, none of the judges in any of the state's courts
have salary protection. Only one section of the Constitution even
hints at such insulation from political retribution and even then the
protection may be illusory. 16 Members of the judiciary therefore
enjoy some measure of salary protection at least until the legisla-
ture meets again and amends the general law of the state. Hence,
according to Becker's definition of judicial independence, Florida
courts are not as independent as federal courts and many state
courts where all three elements, including salary protection, are
satisfied through constitutional provisions, statute, or tacit practice.
This lack of judicial independence pre-dates the events of 2000 but
did not impact the courts because the public conflicts were muted.
The lack of salary protection, however, means that the courts are
more readily disciplined than even most legislators previously un-
derstood. Florida's state lawmakers are now well aware of this fact
due to the events of the 2000 election.
IU1. FLORIDA'S POLITICAL HISTORY: THE PROLOGUE
A. Statewide Demographics: A "Polyglot" of Cultures
To understand the impact of politics on the Florida judiciary, one
must first appreciate Florida's heterogeneous regions. Each region
has its own distinct culture, which makes generalizations about the
state problematic. Demographically, Florida's population is rap-
idly growing, with approximately 700 people joining the state's
population each day. 7 Because Florida's population is always
changing, Floridians have been characterized as "rootless" in that
they lack many traditional political anchors (e.g., churches, labor
Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform, 95
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 315-30 (2001) (arguing that efforts to remove partisanship from
judicial selection do not entirely insulate judges from the effects of party politics).
15. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 8, 10. See also BAST, supra note 12, at 21, 29; Roberts,
supra note 12, at 200. We more fully discuss the changes in judicial selection below.
See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text.
16. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 14 (providing that "all justices and judges shall be com-
pensated only by state salaries fixed by general law") (emphasis added).
17. THOMAS R. DYE, POLITICS IN FLORIDA 2 (1998).
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unions) that typically influence voters' political affiliations.18 Ac-
cordingly, Florida voters "drift from candidate to candidate with
little lasting loyalty."'19 Historically, the state's politics were, like
those of other Confederate states, "white, conservative, segrega-
tionist, and one-party Democratic."" ° That homogeneity, politi-
cally speaking, was premised on race, an issue that has declined in
saliency but not disappeared.2 ' Over the last forty years, the state's
population has grown more diverse and its political culture more
variegated.
Florida is divided into three regions, each with a distinct culture
and political tendency. The locus of political power has shifted
from the northern part of the state (Tallahassee, the state capital),
to the central (Orlando, Daytona Beach, and the Space Coast),
southwest (Tampa-St. Petersburg and Clearwater), and southeast
(Miami, Ft. Lauderdale, and Palm Beach) regions. While the bulk
of the state has shifted its political allegiance in recent years, those
living in the northern part of the state have retained their conserva-
tive politics. The central Florida region, however, is the state's
most rapidly growing area and tends to be a swing area in elections.
Its voters tend to support conservative candidates and issues, al-
though many retirees come to the area and support Democratic
candidates. The retirees who dominate the southwestern part of
the state tend to be economically well-off, Midwestern, and Repub-
lican. The southeastern region is "a polyglot of cultures, '2 includ-
ing Anglo-Saxon, Jewish, African-American, Haitian, and Hispanic
(which is primarily Cuban in origin, although that too is changing).
This mixture produces divergent political affiliations throughout
the region.23
B. Politics Old and New: "Pork Choppers" and
Political Realignment in Florida
The main factor driving the changes in the state's politics has
been the tremendous population growth as millions of newcomers
18. See id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See EDWARD G. CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 116-19 (1989).
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 2-8; see also Drew Noble Lanier, Florida, in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 1 (Herbert M.
Kritzer ed., forthcoming June 2002).
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moved into the state beginning in the early 1950s.2 4 These new im-
migrants brought diversity to the state in terms of social back-
ground and political party affiliations. During the period of the
Solid South, 5 the state legislature was dominated by Southern
Democrats from rural districts, popularly known as "pork chop-
pers. ' 26 For many years, these Democrats struggled to retain con-
trol of political power within the state. Ultimately, they fell victim
to the Warren Court's reapportionment decisions.2 7 In the after-
math, insurgent Republican strength was first consistently demon-
strated by the 1966 gubernatorial election of Claude Kirk, the first
Republican elected in Florida since the Reconstruction Era.28 Un-
til the 1970s, party affiliation among traditional Southern Demo-
crats held, but eventually many shifted their allegiance to the
Republican Party.29 Since that time, Florida has consistently voted
Republican and has often supported the Republican candidate in
presidential elections. 30 This change in long-term political alle-
24. DYE, supra note 17, at 1-2.
25. See V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949).
26. The term "pork choppers" was coined by Tampa Tribune editor James Clen-
denin. He "relentlessly slammed legislative leadership for its narrow perspective, in-
sisting that the small county representatives 'fought only for pork, not principle."'
FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON REAPPORTIONMENT, Reapportionment
in Florida: Out of the 19th Century, Into the 21st, in REAPPORTIONMENT AND REPRE-
SENTATION IN FLORIDA: A HISTORICAL COLLECTION 439-43 (Susan A. MacManus
ed., 1991); cf. Hugh Douglas Price, Florida: Politics and the "Pork Choppers," in THE
POLITICS OF REAPPORTIONMENT 96, 101-02 (Malcolm E. Jewell ed., 1962) (noting that
the term "pork chopper" is a informal term referring to someone who "benefits from
preferential place at the expense of the commonweal").
27. As the nation's population moved from rural to urban areas, questions of
equal political representation became more pressing. Urban representation lagged
behind the changes in the distribution of the population while rural districts retained a
disproportionate influence in the state legislatures. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 550-54 (1964) (affirming the principle of "one man, one vote"); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 190 (1962) (holding that state legislative malapportionment was a justici-
able question, and thus reversing its holding in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946)). The Court later extended its holding to the Congress in Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
28. See generally EDMUND F. KALLINA, CLAUDE KIRK & THE POLITICS OF CON-
FRONTATION (1993).
29. See Burton M. Atkins, Judicial Elections: What the Evidence Shows, 50 FLA.
B.J. 152, 153 (1976); see also Austin Ranney, Parties in State Politics, in POLITICS IN
THE AMERICAN STATES 61 (Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines eds., 3d ed. 1976).
30. EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE VITAL SOUTH: How PRESIDENTS ARE
ELECTED 74-75 (1992); GARY KING & LYN RAGSDALE, THE ELUSIVE EXECUTIVE:
DISCOVERING STATISTICAL PATTERNS IN THE PRESIDENCY 439-46 (1988); HOWARD
W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN POLITICS 81,
108 (5th ed. 1995). This does not imply, however, that Florida has always supported
Republican candidates during this period. Florida voters supported Democratic can-
didates Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 and Jimmy Carter in 1976. Id.
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giance is known as a political realignment. 31 Such changes in affili-
ation from the Democratic party to the Republican party is
characteristic of most Southern states in the last thirty years.32 The
whole region has transformed from one solidly Democratic to one
consistently conservative and thus more competitive between the
two major parties.33
These shifting loyalties within the Florida electorate have exac-
erbated the tension between the judiciary and the democratically-
elected branches-the executive and the legislature. Because of
structural differences in their selection process, the judicial branch
grew out of synchronization with its sister branches over time. Un-
like the judiciary, the executive and the legislature have been
popularly elected throughout the state's history. 34 Thus, they are
intimately tied to changes in public opinion and shifts in political
affiliation among the electorate. Accordingly, when the state's
electorate became more Republican, a Republican governor,
Claude Kirk, was elected in 1966. Thereafter, while the state was
still dominated by Democratic officials at the local level, Republi-
can strongholds developed in some areas of the state and Kirk's
Republican appointees helped break the "Democratic stranglehold
on the offices" of the state. However, the judiciary was not as
quick to respond. This lack of responsiveness led to changes in the
selection process for the district courts of appeal and the Florida
Supreme Court that diminished the link between the public and
31. Jonathan Knuckey, Ideological Realignment and Partisan Change in the Ameri-
can South, 1972-1996, 29 POLITICS AND POLICY 337-58 (2001) [hereinafter Knuckey,
Ideological Realignment]; ALEXANDER P. LAMIS, THE Two-PARTY SOUTH, 301-04
(2d. rev. ed. 1990) [hereinafter LAMIS, Two-PARTY SOUTH]. The studies examining
this phenomenon are vast. See, e.g., WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS
AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); ALEXANDER P. LAMIS,
SOUTHERN POLITICS IN THE 1990s (1999) [hereinafter LAMIS, SOUHTERN POLITICS];
Paul Allen Beck, The Dealignment Era in America, in ELECTORAL CHANGE IN AD-
VANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan & Paul Allen
Beck eds., 1984); Charles S. Bullock, 1II, Creeping Realignment in the South, in THE
SOUTH'S NEW POLITICS: REALIGNMENT AND DEALIGNMENT (Robert H. Swan-
sbrough & David M. Brodsky eds., 1987); Edward G. Carmines, The Logic of Party
Alignments, 3 J. OF THEORETICAL POL. 65-85 (1991). See also Jonathan Knuckey, Ex-
plaining Republican Success in Southern U.S. House Elections in the 1990s, 21 AM.
REV. OF POL. 179-200 (2000) (demonstrating that partisan realignment has extended
from the state legislatures to the U.S. Congress) [hereinafter Knuckey, Explaining
Repubican Success].
32. Bullock, supra note 31 passim.
33. See, e.g., Knuckey, Ideological Realignment, supra note 31 passim.
34. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 15 (setting out the terms for legislative representa-
tives); FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5 (setting out the terms for state executives).
35. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 157; see also KALLINA, supra note 28.
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the members of those courts. These changes distanced those jurists
not only from changes in public opinion, but also from the views of
the other two branches who were riding the crest of ascending Re-
publican power in the state.
C. History of Florida Judicial Selection:
"The Silent De Facto Conspiracy"
Historically, Florida state courts were the non-controversial ser-
vants of the state's dominant political forces.36 That posture is typi-
cal of state courts throughout the United States. Since state courts
are intimately tied to the political structure of the state, they tend
to be creatures of local government infused with local values and
mores.37 The Florida Supreme Court's position of ideological con-
gruence with the dominant political culture, however, began to un-
ravel in the 1960s. The degree to which it conflicted with the
electorate varied over time, as will be explained.
Before those conflicts began to occur, several changes were
made in the judicial selection process in an effort by the dominant
conservative political forces to maintain control over the courts.
Although nominally Democratic in party affiliation until the late
1960s, these forces controlled the Florida Bar, a so-called inte-
grated bar, in which membership is mandatory for all practicing
attorneys in the state.38 Traditional political practice in the 1960s
was that incumbent judges would resign their office a year or so
prior to retirement. The governor would then fill that vacancy
based on recommendations from the Bar and other political associ-
ates. The appointee would thereby be able to stand for re-election
as an incumbent. In a partisan election, there was an extremely
high probability of reelection. If the judge served a full term, in
contrast, the electorate would directly choose the successor in par-
tisan elections without the imprimatur of gubernatorial approval.39
This "silent de facto conspiracy that existed among the judiciary,
the Florida Bar, and the various governors"40 has straightforward
structural foundations. Practicing attorneys are reticent to run
against sitting judges for fear that they may lose, earning the ire
and enmity of the judges who will decide their cases. The bar asso-
36. In fact, one of the authors of this article entitled his review of Florida courts
accordingly. See Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4.
37. See NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 174.
38. NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 131-32.
39. Atkins, supra note 29, at 153-54; see also Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4,
at 156-57.
40. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 157.
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ciation itself tends to support the incumbent candidate, making it
even more difficult for challengers to gather support.4 Moreover,
judicial elections are bland and non-controversial due, in large
part, to canons of ethics that prevent judicial candidates from stak-
ing out issue positions during the campaign.4" This dynamic makes
it difficult for voters to evaluate and distinguish candidates for judi-
cial office. In fact, those sitting judges who are not re-elected usu-
ally fail in their bid due to personal scandal. 43 "For example, one
[Florida] judge was found to be printing pornography on his office
computer. Local attorneys and other judges had been aware of the
drinking problem of another judge for years, but no effective ac-
tion was taken until he hit a parked police car after a liquid
lunch."'44 Accordingly, partisan changes in the composition of the
bench occurred with much less frequency and at a much slower
pace than in the other two branches.
The historical dominance of the state Democratic Party, a ves-
tige of the Solid South, reinforced this trend. The election of
Claude Kirk as governor first demonstrated the effect of potential
Republican voters in the state. This changed the partisan dynamics
of the selection process since Republican candidates now had a
fighting chance to first attain office and later to shape the judiciary
through appointments. Indeed, Governor Kirk's appointees to the
bench furthered this transformation. On a statewide basis, how-
ever, Kirk's Republican Supreme Court appointees fell to Demo-
cratic challengers in the subsequent general elections.46
41. Id.; see also NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 170.
42. E.g., Anthony Champagne & Greg Thieleman, Awareness of Trial Court
Judges, 76 JUDICATURE 271-77 (1991); Marie Hojnacki and Lawrence Baum, Choos-
ing Judicial Candidates, 75 JUDICATURE 300-09 (1992); cf. Karl, supra note 14, 291-96
(discussing the relatively lackluster 1976 campaign for seats on the Florida Supreme
Court); William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at Al.
43. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 157.
44. Id.
45. Also, because judges are elected, they must campaign and raise funds to pay
for the expense of that effort. This process inevitably raises questions of impropriety
and the legitimacy of judges who seek contributions from the lawyers who may later
appear in their courts. See, e.g., NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 170; see also Burton
Atkins, Judges' Perspective on Judicial Selection, 49 ST. GOV'T 182 (1976).
46. This trend reflected the Democratic dominance of state politics despite Kirk's
election in 1966, and a split in the Democratic ranks eventually developed. His oppo-
nent, Robert King High (the mayor of Miami), was perceived as too liberal, so critical
financial support went to Kirk. This, coupled with the usual decline in turnout of less
educated Democratic voters in the off-year election of 1966, proved insurmountable
for King, especially given the animosity against the Democratic National Party in
1038
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Regardless, the harbingers of change were clear, leading to sev-
eral changes in judicial election procedures. Although these
changes were intended to retain Democratic judges, their general
effect was to improve Republican candidates' chances of attaining
office by moving major statewide races to an off-year election cy-
cle.47 By the 1980s, the Republican party was clearly on the rise,
capturing more legislative seats with each election. 8 The House
first came under Republican control in 1994, and the Senate fol-
lowed in 1996.19 For the first time since Reconstruction, the
Republicans were in the majority." During the same time period,
in 1994, Republican gubernatorial candidate John Ellis "Jeb" Bush
lost to Democrat Lawton Chiles, a former U.S. Senator.5 This de-
feat largely nullified Republican legislative gains within the judici-
ary since it preserved the older, Democratic elements in control of
access to the bench. Bush, however, ultimately prevailed and won
the post in 1998, defeating former Democratic Lieutenant Gover-
nor Buddy McKay. 2 Hence, beginning in 1998, the Republicans
held control of both the governorship and the legislature, two key
elements for influence over the judiciary. 3
D. Changes in the Judicial Selection Processes Over Time:
From Partisanship to the Merit System
Largely because Governor Kirk's judicial appointees were con-
sidered to be partisan, Florida voters made the selection process 54
for all four levels of courts nonpartisan. Thus, in 1972, Article V
North Florida after the 1964 presidential election during which North Florida voters
overwhelmingly supported Republican candidate Barry Goldwater.
47. FLA. STAT. ch. 100.041 (2001).
48. See generally MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 2002, at 360-63 (2001).
49. Id. at 362.
50. Wayne L. Francis & Elizabeth G. Williams, The Legislature and the Legislative
Process, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN FLORIDA 124-46, 127 (Robert J. Huck-
shorn ed., 2d ed. 1998).
51. Id. at 364.
52. Id. at 365.
53. Id.
54. The emphasis on elections to select members of the judiciary arose during the
Jacksonian era, which emphasized the democratization of the political process and
sought to diminish the elitism of the judiciary. Most states from 1832 to 1933 adopted
such judicial election. E.g., Atkins, supra note 29, at 152.
55. There are four levels of courts within the Florida judicial hierarchy: the Florida
Supreme Court, the district courts of appeals (5 in number), the circuit courts (20 in
number), and the county courts (67 in number, one for each county). Handberg &
Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 151-52. Circuit courts and county courts have primarily
original jurisdiction to try cases. Id.
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of the Florida Constitution was amended to replace partisan selec-
tion methods with nonpartisan judicial elections. This change from
partisan to nonpartisan elections coincided with the state becoming
a more competitive, two-party system and the decline of the Flor-
ida Democratic party's historical hegemony.56 Moreover, in 1972
an amendment was passed instituting an appointment process to
fill interim vacancies. This enhanced the governor's power over
the judiciary because appointed judges had rarely encountered
even minimal opposition and even more rarely were defeated due
to the difficulties of opposing an incumbent.
The larger effect of this change from partisan to nonpartisan
elections was to diminish gradually the link between the courts and
the partisan dynamics of the state. This created a lag between
changes in public opinion, quickly felt by the executive and the leg-
islative branches, and the composition and decision-making of the
Florida judiciary. Although the Republican Party was on the rise
in Florida, that change was not mirrored in the courts over which
traditional political forces, like the Florida Bar, still held sway.
Democrats also retained control of the legislature while Republi-
can governors, J. Claude Kirk58 and Bob Martinez,59 were elected
for only single terms. The Republican Party's ability to impact the
judiciary was therefore limited.6"
The system of non-partisan election of judges continued un-
abated until a series of incidents in the mid-1970s involving four of
the Florida Supreme Court's seven justices. Two of the justices
were accused of attempting to influence separate decisions in lower
courts. The allegations were so serious that the legislature invoked
56. Indeed, this correlation has been observed in other states as well. Atkins,
supra note 29, at 153. See generally BURNHAM, supra note 31; LAMIS, SOUTHERN
POLITICS, supra note 31; LAMIS, Two-PARTY SOUTH, supra note 31; Beck, supra note
31; Bullock, supra note 31; Carmines, supra note 31; Knuckey, Explaining Republican
Success, supra note 31; Knuckey, Ideological Realignment, supra note 31.
57. Atkins notes that of the forty-six Republican judges who responded to his
mailed survey, about one-half obtained their positions during Governor Kirk's admin-
istration. Atkins, supra note 45, at 182; Atkins, supra note 29, at 153-54.
58. Not only did the Democrats control the legislature, but they also controlled
the cabinet with which Kirk had a running feud. It was rumored that Kirk spent more
time out of Tallahassee than in it because of this. Michael Gannon, A History of
Florida to 1990, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN FLORIDA 50 (Robert J. Huckshorn
ed., 1991).
59. Martinez was only Florida's second Republican governor since Reconstruc-
tion. Id. at 56.
60. Democrats Reuben Askew (1971-79) and Robert "Bob" Graham (1979-1986)
intervened between Kirk's and Martinez's tenures. Thereafter, Lawton Chiles served
two terms until Jeb Bush was elected in 1998. Id. at 52-56.
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the rarely used impeachment process. Both justices resigned
before the formal removal process was consummated, but they
were later disbarred. One later died as a fugitive from drug-smug-
gling charges.61 At about the same time, it became publicly known
that the supreme court's chief justice suffered from alcoholism to
the point of impairing his work. The Judicial Qualifications Com-
mission62 notified him that if he did not seek assistance with his
dependency, he would be removed from office. A fourth justice
was involuntarily committed "to Shands Hospital in Gainesville for
a formal psychiatric evaluation because of his erratic behavior
under stress."' 63 He ultimately was able to return to work and
served as the tribunal's chief justice until the mandatory retirement
age of seventy.64 Because of the lack of justices during this period,
lower court judges had to be appointed to form a quorum so the
court could meet its responsibilities.65
The cumulative effect of these events damaged the legitimacy of
the Florida court system in general and the supreme court in par-
ticular. Many of the state's legal and political elites grew uneasy
because they believed that the apolitical image of the judiciary was
being eroded.66 A movement that the League of Women Voters
and the Florida Bar led arose to change the selection process for
the supreme court and the district courts of appeal to a more indi-
rect, presumably less partisan method.67 Consequently, Florida's
judges were selected differently depending upon their level within
the hierarchy.68 A 1976 referendum changed the method of selec-
tion for appellate court judges from one governed by non-partisan
elections to a merit selection system.69 While the trial courts for-
61. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 158.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 158.
67. Id. Reformers advocate the adoption of the merit system because it circum-
vents the structural problems with candidate recruitment and the voters' lack of infor-
mation. E.g., NEUBAUER, supra note 3, at 171-72.
68. See BAST, supra note 12, at 58; Lanier, supra note 23, at 10.
69. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11. Under this system, a Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion composes a list of three to six potential nominees, from which the governor
makes the ultimate selection. After a period of approximately one year, the selected
judge stands unopposed in a retention election in which voters in his district decides
whether to continue him in office. If successful, the judge serves a six-year term. If
not, then the governor chooses another candidate and the process begins anew. FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 10. See generally LYLE WARRICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS passim (2d ed. 1993); Anthony
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mally retained the nonpartisan election mode, their judges contin-
ued the long-standing, informal practice of resigning prior to their
terms' end, allowing the governor to appoint a successor to reap
the benefits of incumbency. The state legislature recognized this
reality and enacted a modified merit selection system to diminish,
although not eliminate, gubernatorial influence on local judge se-
lection. Under this revised system, the governor would choose an
interim successor from a list of potential nominees compiled by
court-specific judicial nominating commissions.7 ° This system was
much like the one in place for the state's appellate courts.71 Once
the interim term expires, the sitting judge then stands in a competi-
tive election (unlike members of the appellate bench who stand
unopposed) and, if elected, serves a full, six-year term.
Efforts to extend the merit election system for all trial bench
appointments-not simply interim ones-began immediately after
the 1976 vote. The opponents of such efforts perceived merit selec-
tion as the Bar's attempt to disenfranchise them just as their turn at
judicial power came in the political roulette wheel. In North Flor-
ida, primarily Jacksonville, local African-American leaders resisted
such changes because they believed that the adoption of this re-
form would leave the courts hostage to the lawyers, especially the
defense bar, whom they believed held contrary policy views.72 In
South Florida, Hispanic voters, particularly members of the Cu-
ban-American community, raised similar objections. Despite this
resistance, or perhaps because of it, the now Republican-controlled
Florida legislature passed two referenda items authorizing constitu-
tional amendments. The legislature did this thinking that only nar-
row groups opposed the extension of the merit system beyond the
appellate bench. The first referenda was whether to adopt a local
option permitting voters residing in specific counties and within the
state's judicial circuits to choose to adopt the merit system for all
Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53-117 (1986)
(discussing the merit selection system); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Wo-
men and Minorities on State and Federal Appellate Benches: A Cross- Time Compari-
son, 1985 to 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84-92 (2001) (discussing the link between judicial
selection method and the incidence of women and minorities becoming appellate
judges).
70. There are currently twenty-six judicial nominating commissions, one for the
supreme court, one for each of the five district courts of appeal, and one for each of
the twenty judicial circuits, the latter having jurisdiction over appointments to the
circuit and county courts throughout the state. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11.
71. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11.
72. See DYE, supra note 17, at 6-7 (discussing the partisan allegiance of voters in
North Florida and Jacksonville).
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judges in their political subdivision. The referendum was put to
vote in November 1998 and the voters chose to create such an op-
tion for both county and circuit subdivisions by a margin of about
fourteen percent.73 In the second referenda, held in November
2000, the option of selecting judges through merit selection itself
was presented to voters in each of the state's twenty circuits and
sixty-seven counties.74 From this amalgam of eighty-seven differ-
ent elections, the reform failed in all counties and circuits by wide
margins. The closest vote occurred in Broward County, the tradi-
tional Democratic party stronghold in the southeast part of the
state (40% in favor; 60% opposed).75 These elections occurred at
the same time as the 2000 presidential election but with much less
fanfare and more long-term effects for the citizens of the state.76
Thus, Florida's judiciary remains split, with the appellate courts ex-
isting under the merit system, while the state's trial courts are cho-
sen directly by the state's electorate. This division remained in
place until after the 2001 legislative session when several changes
were imposed, which are discussed below.
E. - Setting the Agenda: The Florida Bar and Membership on
the Judicial Nominating Commissions
It is axiomatic in politics that if one can control a decision-mak-
ing body's agenda, then the outcome of that group will largely be
decided. Such is the case regarding the membership of the state's
Judicial Nominating Commissions. Under the system in place after
the 1976 referendum, the Committees were composed of a total of
73. The full text of the ballot measure and the vote data can be obtained at the
Secretary of State's homepage at http://election.dos.state.fl.us. The corresponding
amendment can be found in article V, section 10(b)(1)-(3) of the state constitution.
FLA. CONST. art. V § 10(b)(1)-(3).
74. Louis Jacobson, Lobbying for "Justice" in State Courts, 32 NAT'L. J. 3678
(2001).
75. The vote percentages for each subdivision can be obtained from the Secretary
of State's homepage at http://enight.dos.state.fl.us. The constitutional amendment
specifies that the question cannot be put to the electorate again until two years have
expired since its first presentation. Even then, such a referendum requires the filing
of a petition signed by a number of persons equaling at least ten percent of the votes
cast in the immediately preceding presidential election. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(3).
Broward County recently received intense media coverage because it was the site of
one of the most bitterly contested recounts of the 2000 presidential election. See gen-
erally Don Van Natta Jr., Counting the Vote: The Recount; Recounts Drag On; Court
Battle Lines Are Drawn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al; see also Analysis of Florida
Ballots Proves Favorable To Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at A18.
76. The authors are presently at work examining the factors generally influencing
the Florida voters' rejection of this referendum and the associated implications con-
cerning the Florida judiciary.
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nine members. The governor chose three appointees, the Bar
three, and the governor and the Bar jointly three." Attorney
members of the Commissions have historically been extremely in-
fluential in composing the lists of potential nominees from which
the governor selects the incumbent. Accordingly, the political
views of the Bar influence the types of individuals recommended
for selection and, thus, are material to understanding the political
dynamics affecting appellate judicial selection. Control over the
Florida Bar has become an object of intense campaigning and ma-
neuvering between two main factions-the plaintiffs' bar (who
tend to be more liberal) and defense attorneys (who tend to more
conservative). This type of struggle among ideological coalitions is
common in many state bar associations. 78 Thus, because of the ma-
chinery that the merit selection system instituted at the appellate
level and for interim appointments at the trial court level, the pre-
vailing group within the Bar had indirect control over judicial
nominations. By extension, judicial appointments went to which-
ever faction controlled the committee membership appointment
process. 79 Accordingly, the Bar became an even more influential
player in the politics of judicial selection after 1976.
F. The Supreme Court in the Public Eye
From this cauldron of interrelated forces, the Florida judiciary
began to take shape quietly in the years leading up to the 2000
presidential election. The judiciary, in general, was effectively in-
visible to the public.80 The members of the supreme court were
considered to be moderate or moderately conservative in their de-
77. FLA. STAT. ch. 43.29(i) (2000).
78. See RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE
BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN
COURT PLAN (1969); Charles H. Sheldon, The Role of State Bar Associations in Judi-
cial Selection, 77 JUDICATURE 300, 304-05 (1994) (discussing the influence of partisan
views in the state on the local bar's effects on judicial selection).
79. To become a member of one of the Judicial Nominating Commissions, one
must apply to the Board of Governors. The application form is available on the
Board's section of the Bar homepage (http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/
Board/). Notable among the questions asked of applicants is what their predominant
fields of practice are and whether they are members of the plaintiff or defense bars.
Id.
80. This posture contrasts with that of the California Supreme Court, which has
been much more publicly visible since the 1970s. In fact, in 1986, four California
Supreme Court justices were defeated including the tribunal's highly controversial
chief justice, Rose Bird. John Culver & John Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of
Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JUDICATURE 81-89 (1986).
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cision-making with occasional flashes of progressivism.81 In fact,
no appellate court judge has lost a retention election since the
merit system's inception,82 although some supreme court justices
have been severely challenged because of their purported views.
For example, challenges to Rosemary Barkett, the first female
member of the supreme court and its chief justice,83 and Leander
Shaw, the African-American author of the state's abortion deci-
sion, 84 came from a combination of groups, including anti-abortion
forces8" and the National Rifle Association. 86 Barkett was particu-
larly opposed because she was considered too lenient in criminal
cases.87 The elections of Barkett and Shaw notwithstanding, the
remaining justices, who were not associated with controversial is-
sues, have not generally attracted that kind of organized opposi-
tion.8 However the court came into conflict with the Republican-
controlled legislature and Republican Governor Bush in the Spring
of 1999 for invalidating laws that would have accelerated death
penalty executions in the state in the wake of one inmate being
bloodied during an electrocution. 9 Indeed, Bush and the legisla-
81. Handberg & Lawhorn, supra note 4, at 148.
82. However, the average negative vote has risen from 25% to 34% from 1990 to
1994. Handberg, supra note 1, at 133 (citing Michelle L. Young, Merit Retention Elec-
tion: What the Evidence Shows (June 1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
University of Central Florida) (data based on figures from the Division of Elections
of the Florida State Department)).
83. Chief Justice Barkett was nominated by President Clinton in 1993 for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Her appointment was confirmed in 1994.
Craig Crawford, Senate Confirms Florida Chief Justice Barkett for Federal Judgeship,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, April 15, 1994, at Al.
84. In re T.W., No. 74.143, 1989 Fla. LEXIS 1226, 1229 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1989) (substi-
tuted opinion for original opinion (551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989)) (invalidating a paren-
tal consent statute requiring minors to obtain parental approval to have an abortion).
85. Donna O'Neal, Anti-Abortion Activists Put Pressure On Shaw, ORLANDO SEN.
TINEL TRIB., Oct. 4, 1990, at B4.
86. The National Rifle Association is an organization dedicated to protecting the
right of the people to keep and bear arms. See generally http://www.mynra.com.
87. O'Neal, supra note 85, at B4. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the
Judiciary, 80 JUDICATURE 165, 169-70 (1997) (discussing the specific allegations and
misrepresentations leveled against Chief Justice Barkett's record).
88. Currently, the justices are Charles T. Wells (Chief Justice, appointed by Gov-
ernor Chiles in 1994); Leander J. Shaw, Jr. (appointed by Governor Graham in 1983);
Major B. Harding (appointed by Governor Chiles in 1991); Harry Lee Anstead (ap-
pointed by Governor Chiles in 1994); Barbara J. Pariente (appointed by Governor
Chiles in 1997); R. Fred Lewis (appointed by Governor Chiles in 1998); and, Peggy A.
Quince (appointed jointly by Governor Chiles and in-coming Governor Bush in
1998). See http://www.flcourts.org. Thus, of the seven justices, a Democratic governor
appointed six of them, and the last was jointly appointed by a Democrat. Id.
89. Justice Leander Shaw, as part of his dissent from the majority's decision in the
fall of 1999 to uphold the use of the electrocution, posted three photos on his website
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ture threatened to reduce the court's budget allocation and
staffing. 90
IV. POLrrIcS AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Election and Its Aftermath: Surprise, Chaos, and
a Brewing Storm
After what was generally perceived as a lackluster election, vot-
ers cast their ballots in November 2000 for the next president of
the United States. After a night of contradictory network election
coverage, it remained unclear who was the winner, Republican
George W. Bush or Democrat Al Gore. A dramatic public compe-
tition soon followed with the presidency as the ultimate prize. Al
Gore's campaign team alleged that many ballots had not been
counted because of voting machine errors and other voting irregu-
larities. 91 Gore argued that if these votes were properly consid-
ered, he would have the majority of votes in the State.92 This
would earn him Florida's 25 Electoral College votes and, ulti-
mately, the presidency because neither candidate had reached the
required 270 margin to attain the office. 93 As a result, election con-
test suits were filed in several different counties where the
problems first arose.94 During those events, the Florida courts be-
came the central forum for litigating the disputes as to when ballot
recounts should terminate or begin, what standards to employ, and
which ballots should be counted as valid expressions of voter in-
tent. Florida courts, and in particular the Florida Supreme Court,
dominated the political and legal process until they were ultimately
trumped by a U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, two of the string of
cases wound up at the Florida Supreme Court's door. The first
depicting the bloody body of Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis, who was the last person whom
the state had electrocuted. Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 441 (1999) (Shaw,
J., dissenting).
90. W.W. Norton, Bush v. Gore: The Fracas Over Florida 9 (2001). This review is
also available online (http://www.wwnorton.e-2000/home.htm) [hereinafter Fracas
Over Florida]. See generally also Claire Cooper, Florida Court in the Crosshairs in
Wake of 'Gore v. Bush,' NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, April 3, 2001.
91. For example, approximately 20,000 votes in Palm Beach County were initially
invalidated because voters were purportedly confused about the construction of the
two-paged or "butterfly" ballot and inadvertently marked more than one candidate
for president. Id. at 4-5.
92. Id. at 12
93. Id. at 10.
94. Unfortunately, an extensive legal analysis of these cases is beyond the scope of
this article.
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dealt with the question of whether Florida secretary of state Kathe-
rine Harris could certify the election results and refuse to include
the results of still on-going hand recounts across the state. 9 If in
fact Harris certified the results without the recount numbers, Re-
publican George Bush would take the state and win the presidency.
On November 21 (two weeks after election day), the Florida Su-
preme Court ruled that Harris must delay her certification and wait
until 5 p.m. on November 26 to certify the amended totals. 96 How-
ever, the Bush legal team sought emergency relief from the U.S.
Supreme Court, arguing in part that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision intruded upon the power of the state legislature, enumer-
ated in Article II of the U.S. Constitution,97 to specify the manner
of the election of the state's presidential electors.98 The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in a per curiam opinion, ultimately ruled on Decem-
ber 4, 2000 (nearly one month after the election) and vacated the
Florida Supreme Court opinion. The United States Supreme
Court asked the lower court to clarify the basis of its earlier deci-
sion,99 thus serving "notice that it was willing ... to overrule the
state's supreme court if it found reason to do so."' ° With that rul-
ing, the high court remanded the case to the Florida Supreme
Court for further consideration. In the midst of the legal battles,
Florida House of Representatives speaker-elect and Republican
Tom Feeney chastised the Florida Supreme Court for its decision
to extend the certification deadline and announced that he would
seek to have the Florida legislature certify the state's electors for
Bush' 01 under provisions of the U.S. Code 02 should the Florida
Supreme Court ultimately rule for Gore.
The second case to reach the Florida Supreme Court for decision
was Gore's actual challenge of the election results on various
grounds10 3 (the previous case only dealt with recount issues). On
December 4, 2000, Leon County Court Judge L. Sander Sauls ruled
95. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1281 (Fla.
2000) (amended opinion of November 21, 2000 corrected on January 9, 2001).
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
98. Fracas Over Florida, supra note 90, at 8-9.
99. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
100. Fracas Over Florida, supra note 90, at 26-27.
101. Steve Miller, Florida House OKs Bush Electors, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000
at Al (noting that the Florida House of Representatives approved a slate of electors
for Bush hours before the United States Supreme Court ruled in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 110 (2000)).
102. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
103. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
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against each of Gore's claims that the results were invalid." 4 Once
again Gore's attorneys immediately appealed to the Florida Su-
preme Court. On December 8, the court issued its ruling, reversing
the lower court and ordering that disputed ballots in several coun-
ties be reviewed and some ballots be credited to Gore's column.10 5
In the end, the court's decision left Gore about 150 votes shy of
Bush's total.0 6
As before, Bush's attorneys raced to file an emergency appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court. They argued that the Florida Supreme
Court had violated the doctrine of separation of powers by over-
stepping its bounds and treading on the defined power of the
state's legislature to select presidential electors. Bush's attorneys
also argued that the Florida Supreme Court's allowance of re-
counts in various counties without a single, common standard for
judging valid votes violated the Equal Protection Clause. 7 On
December 12, 2000, the Court's ruling was made public. The Court
ruled in favor of Bush, holding that the recount procedures that the
Florida Supreme Court ordered violated Equal Protection con-
cerns.'0 8 The Court, however, was split along partisan lines as to
what remedy to order.10 9 Five justices determined that the Florida
Supreme Court's mandated recounts could not be completed and
reviewed by the judiciary in sufficient time to allow for the state's
electors to be chosen under the Florida legislature's safe harbor
provision. 10 Two justices posited that the case could be remanded
to the Florida Supreme Court, directing it to order a recount using
constitutionally proper procedures establishing uniform and consis-
tent standards to determine the validity of a legal vote."' In poign-
ant dissent, Justice Stevens wrote, "[a]lthough we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It
is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of
the rule of law." 1 12
104. See William Glaberson, Contesting the Vote: The Legal Issues; Several Paths
Available To Extend the Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2000, at A29.
105. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
106. Id.
107. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Contesting the Vote: The Overview; Justices'
Questions Underline the Divide on Whether Hand Recount Can Be Fair, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2000 at Al.
108. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
109. Id. at 111.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 144-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 128-129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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From a political perspective, the Florida Supreme Court became
the primary vehicle for maintaining the recount process (a position
favorable to Gore) while the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately de-
cided the question by terminating all recounts (a decision favorable
to Bush).113 The ruling majorities for both tribunals were per-
ceived by many as rendering a politically tainted decision, albeit in
different directions, thus casting the Florida Supreme Court into
the eye of the hurricane as the Florida legislature considered how
to react to what it perceived as blatant partisanship by the court's
members.
B. The Legislature Strikes Backs: House Bill 367 and
Joint Resolution HJR 627
After the public controversy of the presidential election and the
surrounding legal drama concluded, the Florida legislature's new
session began in March 2001.114 Among the measures that the
members considered were two concerning the courts, both reflect-
ing the strained relations between the legislature and the supreme
court. The first of these was House Bill 367.115 The bill revised the
procedures for selecting the members of the Judicial Nominating
Commissions. 1 6 Recall that prior to 2001, under the merit system
instituted in 1976, the Judicial Nominating Commissions were com-
posed of three members nominated by the Bar, three by the gover-
nor, and three by the Bar and governor together.1 7 Under the
revised bill, however, the Florida Bar recommends four commis-
sion members for selection and the governor may reject all four at
will." 8 The governor exclusively selects the additional five mem-
bers, although two of these individuals must be Florida Bar mem-
bers. 19 Accordingly, the governor's influence has drastically
increased under the proposal. Indeed, Governor Bush signed the
bill on June 19, 2001, giving him all but total control of the selec-
tion Florida's appellate judges and a heightened degree of influ-
113. For a discussion of the signaling on-going between the Florida Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court during these cases, see Paul Brace and Laura Langer,
The Florida Supreme Court in the 2000 Presidential Election: Ambiguity, Ideology, and
Signaling in a Judicial Hierarchy, 34 PS: POL. Sci. & POL. 645 (2001).
114. For more information on the 2001 session, see the Online Sunshine site at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us.
115. H.B. 367, 1st Sess. (Fla. 2001).
116. Id.
117. FLA. STAT. 43.291 (2001).
118. Id.
119. Id.
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ence over the state's trial courts when there is an interim
appointment. 120 Simultaneously, the interests of the Bar have a
stronger voice in the selection process because five of the nine
nominees must be Bar members. 121
In addition to the changes in appointment procedures for the
Judicial Nominating Commissions, the legislature also considered
an amendment to the state constitution. 122 Under the proposal,
judges on the district courts of appeal and justices of the supreme
court who stand in retention elections must obtain a two-thirds ma-
jority of votes, rather than the pre-existing majority margin, which
likely would make it more difficult for judges to be retained.123
Recall that if a judge is not retained, then the governor enjoys the
right to nominate a successor. Thus, this proposed provision en-
larges the amount of power that the governor enjoys under law.
The legislature did seek to limit the governor's power to some ex-
tent by requiring, as in the federal system, that he submit his judi-
cial nominees to the senate for confirmation. 24 In the same
provision, however, the legislature proposed to eliminate the Judi-
cial Nominating Commissions entirely. 25 In addition, the proposal
would have nullified the requirement that the state's attorneys join
the state Bar and the Bar's involvement in judicial selection,
thereby expanding the governor's power even further. Although
the bill died in the Committee on Judicial Oversight in May of
2001,26 it is a harbinger of the increased partisan influences being
brought to bear on the judiciary, particularly the appellate courts,
that serve to restrain the discretion of the state's courts and hence
imperil judicial independence.
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IMPERILED: THE EPILOGUE
As a result of both these measures, the independence of the
state's judiciary has been implicitly whittled down. The most nota-
ble erosion is that of the state supreme court, which holds signifi-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. S.B. 1794, 103rd Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The bill also would have limited to some extent the supreme court's juris-
diction and made its advisory opinions non-binding. Id. See also Cooper, supra note
90.
126. The House Joint Resolution may be obtained from the Online Sunshine site at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us.
1050
EYE OF THE HURRICANE
cant policy-making power.2 7 According to Becker, l28 one measure
of judicial independence is the extent to which executive appoint-
ment to the courts is checked in some fashion: Unlike the federal
system,12 9 no other branch or external group formally scrutinizes
the Florida governor's judicial choices. Although to some extent
the governor's discretion is limited by the collective decisions of
the Judicial Nominating Commissions, its members are essentially
his choice alone and presumably share his policy views about which
candidates are qualified for the bench.' 30 Further, while appellate
judges have to enter retention elections approximately one year af-
ter their selection to the bench, such elections do not approximate
the democratic ideal of accountability because informed voters do
not choose from among different candidates. This results in the
vast majority of judges being retained.3 The Florida governor is
accordingly essentially unrestrained in his selection of appellate
(and many trial court) judges.
Yet, the Republican legislature and Governor Bush may regret
the passage of this bill. Although the governor has control over the
judiciary, the governor is constitutionally limited to two four-year
terms.132 The revised statute provides for staggered terms for the
commission members, requiring two appointments to end July 1,
2002; two to end on July 1, 2003; and, two to end in July 2004.133
Governor Bush must stand for re-election in November 2002.
Given economic and other issues, re-election is never assured for a
public official. A Democratic governor may be elected and, if so,
the current administration will have handed its successor a large
127. Executive attacks on judicial independence have also occurred at the federal
level. Most notable was Franklin D. Roosevelt infamous 1937 court-packing plan
under which he would be able to nominate an additional justice for every current
justice who was over the age of seventy. Roosevelt ostensibly proposed the plan be-
cause of the Court's lag in workload; however, its partisan overtones were clear. The
Court had up until 1937 struck down a series of New Deal measures, drawing the ire
of not only Roosevelt but also the Democratically-controlled Congress. However,
despite Roosevelt's high popularity, his plan came under attack as reflecting a type of
blatant politicking that the public would not tolerate with regard to the U.S. Supreme
Court. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 56-58 (5th ed. 2001).
128. BECKER, supra note 6, at 144.
129. The United States President nominates federal judges and the Senate confirms
the nominees. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
130. The current membership of each Judicial Nominating Commission may be ob-
tained on the Florida Bar's home page at http://www.flabar.org/newflabar/organiza-
tion/committees/standing/jnccirmemb.html.
131. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
132. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
133. FLA. STAT. ch. 43.291(3) (2001).
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cache of ammunition to use in partisan battles through judicial
selection.
The irony of these changes is striking. The changes that the leg-
islature and the governor have instituted were enacted under the
guise of restraining the partisanship of a "runaway" tribunal, but
have served to politicize the courts even more.13 4 Accordingly,
Florida's judiciary may in the near term be damaged in its efforts
to stand apart from the views of the executive or the legislature
and exercise discretion concerning what policies to continue and
which ones to nullify. This would tip the balance of power in favor
of the executive branch to the detriment of the judiciary's overall
independence. This might be manifested in comparably lower
levels of diffuse support for the Florida courts as a whole, signifi-
cantly diminishing their reservoir of legitimacy. Although not nec-
essarily opposites, a tension exists between judicial independence
and accountability, a tension that leads to inflamed rhetoric when
partisans clash. Florida courts moved to center stage both by
choice and from political pressures in the state. Ironically, their
greatest legacy may be the shredding of the veil of impartiality nor-
mally surrounding the courts. This would be a regrettable loss; one
possibly unrecoverable in a young century already heavy with tur-
moil and disaster.
134. Fracas Over Florida, supra note 90, at 30.
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